

Format string vulnerabilities

Goal

- Take control of the program (as usual)
- How?
 - Write4 (write 4 bytes to an arbitrary location)
 - Inject shellcode (or other exploits) into the process


What should we overwrite?

- Saved instruction pointer (seip)
- Other pointers to code (we'll come back to this)

The way snprintf() normally works


```
void foo(int w) {
    char buf[500];
    const char *ending = w==1? """ :"s";
    sprintf(buf, 500, "Hello %d world%s",
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}

...
foo(5);
```




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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...  
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Now with %n

```
void foo(int w) {  
    char buf[500];  
    int x;  
    sprintf(buf, 500, "Hello %d world%n",  
            w, &x);  
}  
...  
foo(5);
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
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
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
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
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
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
Attacker controlled format string

```
void foo(const char *evil) {  
    char buf[500];  
    sprintf(buf, 500, evil);  
}  
...  
foo("ZZZZ%x%x%x%x");
```




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
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
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
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
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


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
‘Z’ = 0x5a

next arg →




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
Overwriting seip

```
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}  
...  
foo("\xe6\xff\xff\xbf%x%x%x%n");
```




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
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
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```



Picking the bytes to write

- Use %<len>x to control the length of the output
- Use %hn to write just the least-significant byte of the length

Almost putting it all together

```
evil = "<address>ZZZZ"  
      "<address+1>ZZZZ"  
      "<address+2>ZZZZ"  
      "<address+3>"  
      "%8x%8x...%8x"  
      "%<len>x%hhn"  
      "%<len>x%hhn"  
      "%<len>x%hhn"  
      "%<len>x%hhn";
```

Misaligned buf

- If `buf` is not 4-byte aligned, prepend 1, 2, or 3 characters to `evil`


Advantages of format string exploits

- No need to smash the stack (targeted write)
- Avoids defenses such as stack canaries!
 - Stack canary is a random word pushed onto the stack that is checked before the function returns

Stack Canaries

Example from Target 6:

```
_Z16print_sub_stringRK18SubStringReference:  
    pushl    %ebp  
    movl    %esp, %ebp  
    pushl    %ebx  
    subl    $68, %esp  
    movl    8(%ebp), %ebx    // str  
    movl    %gs:20, %eax    // canary!  
    movl    %eax, -12(%ebp) // on stack  
    xorl    %eax, %eax  
  
...  
    movl    -12(%ebp), %eax // load canary  
    xorl    %gs:20, %eax    // compare them  
    je     .L13  
    call    __stack_chk_fail  
.L13:  
    addl    $68, %esp  
    popl    %ebx  
    popl    %ebp  
    ret
```



Disadvantages of format string exploits

- Easy to catch so rarer:

```
$ gcc -Wformat=2 f.c
f.c: In function 'main':
f.c:5: warning: format not a string literal and no
format arguments
```
- Tricky to exploit compared to buffer overflows

What else can we overwrite?

- Function pointers
- C++ vtables
- Global offset table (GOT)

Function pointers

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int compare(const void *a,
            const void *b) {
    const int *x = a;
    const int *y = b;
    return *x - *y;
}

int main() {
    int i;
    int arr[6] = {2, 1, 5, 13, 8, 4};
    qsort(arr, 6, 4, compare);
    for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i)
        printf("%d ", arr[i]);
    putchar('\n');
    return 0;
}
```

main:

```
    pushl  %ebp
    movl  %esp, %ebp
    ...
    leal   24(%esp), %esi // arr
    ...
    movl   $compare, 12(%esp)
    movl   $4, 8(%esp)
    movl   $6, 4(%esp)
    movl   %esi, (%esp)
    call   qsort
```

qsort:

```
    ...
    call   *0x14(%ebp)
    ...
```

C++ Virtual function tables (vtable)

```
struct Foo {  
    Foo() {}  
    virtual ~Foo() {}  
    virtual void fun1() {}  
    virtual void fun2() {}  
};  
  
void bar(Foo &f) {  
    f.fun1();  
    f.fun2();  
}  
  
int main() {  
    Foo f;  
    foo(f);  
}
```

`_Z3barR3Foo: // bar(Foo&)
 pushl %ebp
 movl %esp, %ebp
 pushl %ebx
 subl $20, %esp
 movl 8(%ebp), %ebx // ebx <- f
 movl (%ebx), %eax // eax <- vtable
 movl %ebx, (%esp) // (esp) <- this
 call *8(%eax) // call virtual function
 movl (%ebx), %eax // eax <- vtable
 movl %ebx, (%esp) // (esp) <- this
 call *12(%eax) // call virtual function
 addl $20, %esp
 popl %ebx
 popl %ebp
 ret`

vtable for Foo

```
// Real code  
_ZN3FooC1Ev:  
    pushl %ebp  
    movl %esp, %ebp  
    movl 8(%ebp), %eax  
    movl _$ZTV3Foo+8, (%eax)  
    popl %ebp  
    ret  
  
_ZTV3Foo:  
    .long 0  
    .long _ZTI3Foo  
    .long _ZN3FooD1Ev  
    .long _ZN3FooD0Ev  
    .long _ZN3Foo4fun1Ev  
    .long _ZN3Foo4fun2Ev
```

```
// Demangled  
Foo::Foo():  
    pushl %ebp  
    movl %esp, %ebp  
    movl 8(%ebp), %eax  
    movl vtable for Foo+8, (%eax)  
    popl %ebp  
    ret
```

```
vtable for Foo:  
.long 0  
.long typeinfo for Foo  
.long Foo::~Foo()  
.long Foo::~Foo()  
.long Foo::fun1()  
.long Foo::fun2()
```

address of vtable+8
stored in first word
of object

Global Offset Table (GOT)

- Contains pointers to code and data in shared libraries
- Library functions aren't called directly; stub in the Procedure Linkage Table (PLT) called
- E.g., call exit -> call exit@plt
- exit@plt looks up the address of exit in the GOT and jumps to it (not the whole story)
- Overwrite function pointer in GOT