

Lecture 23 – Access Control

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Slides based on Bailey's ECE 422

Authentication vs Authorization

- Authentication — Who goes there?
 - Restrictions on who (or what) can access system
- **Authorization** — Are you allowed to do that?
 - Restrictions on actions of authenticated users
- Authorization is a form of **access control**
- Authorization enforced by
 - Access Control Lists
 - Capabilities

Access Control

- Access control is a collection of methods and components that supports
 - confidentiality
 - integrity
- Goal: allow only authorized **subjects** to access permitted **objects**
- E.g., Least privilege philosophy
 - A subject is granted permissions needed to accomplish required tasks and nothing more

Subjects access objects

- **Subject:** active entity that wants to access an object or the data within an object
 - Examples: users and programs
 - must be authenticated (who is the subject?) and authorized (do they have permission to access the object)
- **Object:** passive entity that contains information
 - Examples: a computer, database, file, computer program, directory, or more fine-grained like a particular field in a table in a database

Example: When a program accesses a file, the program is the subject and the file is the object

Access Control Designs


- Access control designs define rules for users accessing files or devices
- Three common access control designs
 - Mandatory access control
 - Discretionary access control
 - Role-based access control

Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

- It is a restrictive scheme that does not allow users to define permissions on files, regardless of ownership
- Instead, security decisions are made by a central policy administrator
- A common implementation is rule-based access control
 - Subject demonstrates need-to-know in addition to proper security clearance
 - Need-to-know indicates that a subject requires access to object to complete a particular task
- Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) incorporates MAC

MAC, historically

- Intended to protect classified information
- Subjects and objects have security (or sensitivity) labels
 - Clearance level, e.g., CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET
 - Need-to-know categories
- To access a particular object, the subject needs a clearance level at least as high as the subject's and the need-to-know categories



MACs in OSes

- Windows: Mandatory Integrity Control
 - Four integrity levels: low, medium, high, and system
- Linux: multiple approaches: SELinux, AppArmor, and others
 - Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) has fine-grained control (files have labels) but is a pain to administer
 - AppArmor is used in Ubuntu and restricts paths rather than applying labels to files
- macOS/iOS/FreeBSD: Uses TrustedBSD MAC Framework
- Android: Uses SELinux

Discretionary Access Control

- Discretionary access control, or DAC, refers to a scheme where users are given the ability to determine the permissions governing access to their own files.
 - DAC typically features the concept of both users and groups
 - In addition, DAC schemes allow users to grant privileges on resources to other users on the same system.
- Most common design in commercial operating systems
 - Generally less secure than mandatory control
 - Generally easier to implement and more flexible

Common implementation of a DAC

- Users belong to groups
- Every file has an owner (a user) and a group and permissions for the owner, other users in the group, and everyone else
- Every running process is associated with a user and can only read/write/execute files for which it has permission
- Owners of files can change the permissions of those files
 - E.g., `chmod` on UNIX-like operating systems

Role-Based Access Control

- The role-based access control (RBAC) model can be viewed as an evolution of the notion of group-based permissions in file systems.
- An RBAC system is defined with respect to an organization, such as company, a set of resources, such as documents, print services, and network services, and a set of users, such as employees, suppliers, and customers
- Uses a subject's role or task to grant or deny object access

Access control mechanism vs policy

- Mechanism of access control (MAC, DAC, RBAC) is distinct from the policy being enforced
- The policy specifies which **subjects** (or groups of subjects or roles) may perform which **actions** on which **objects**

Example of Implementing Policy

File system Access Control

Access Control Entries and Lists

- An Access Control List (ACL) for a resource (e.g., a file or folder) is a list of zero or more Access Control Entries (ACEs)
- An ACE refers specifies that a certain set of accesses (e.g., read, execute and write) to the resources is allowed or denied for a user or group
- Examples of ACEs for folder “CSCI 343 Grades”
 - Professor; Read; Allow
 - Students; Read; Allow
 - Professor; Write; Allow
 - Students; Write; Deny

Linux File System

- Tree of directories (folders)
- Each directory has links to zero or more files or directories
- Hard link
 - From a directory to a file
 - The same file can have hard links from multiple directories, each with its own filename, but all sharing owner, group, and permissions
 - File deleted when no more hard links to it
- Symbolic link (symlink)
 - From a directory to a target file or directory
 - Stores path to target, which is traversed for each access
 - The same file or directory can have multiple symlinks to it
 - Removal of symlink does not affect target
 - Removal of target invalidates (but not removes) symlinks to it

Unix Permissions

- Standard for all UNIXes
- Every file is owned by a user and has an associated group
- Permissions often displayed in compact 10-character notation
- To see permissions, use `ls -l`

```
jk@sphere:~/test$ ls -l
total 0
-rw-r-----  1 jk  ugrad  0  2005-10-13  07:18  file1
-rwxrwxrwx   1 jk  ugrad  0  2005-10-13  07:18  file2
```

Permissions Examples (Regular Files)

-rw-r--r--	read/write for owner, read-only for everyone else
-rw-r-----	read/write for owner, read-only for group, forbidden to others
-rwx-----	read/write/execute for owner, forbidden to everyone else
-r--r--r--	read-only to everyone, including owner
-rwxrwxrwx	read/write/execute to everyone

Permissions for Directories

- Permissions bits interpreted differently for directories
- *Read* bit allows listing names of files in directory, but not their properties like size and permissions
- *Write* bit allows creating and deleting files within the directory
- *Execute* bit allows entering the directory and getting properties of files in the directory
- Lines for directories in `ls -l` output begin with d, as below:

```
jk@sphere:~/test$ ls -l
```

```
Total 4
```

```
drwxr-xr-x  2 jk  ugrad 4096 2005-10-13 07:37 dir1  
-rw-r--r--  1 jk  ugrad   0 2005-10-13 07:18 file1
```

Permissions Examples (Directories)

drwxr-xr-x	all can enter and list the directory, only owner can add/delete files
drwxrwx---	full access to owner and group, forbidden to others
drwx--x---	full access to owner, group can access known filenames in directory, forbidden to others
-rwxrwxrwx	full access to everyone

Special Permission Bits

- Three other permission bits exist
 - Set-user-ID (“suid” or “setuid”) bit
 - Set-group-ID (“sgid” or “setgid”) bit
 - Sticky bit

Set-user-ID

- Set-user-ID (“suid” or “setuid”) bit
 - On executable files, causes the program to run as file owner regardless of who runs it
 - Ignored for everything else
 - In 10-character display, replaces the 4th character (x or -) with s (or S if not also executable)
 - rwsr-xr-x: setuid, executable by all
 - rwxr-xr-x: executable by all, but not setuid
 - rwSr--r--: setuid, but not executable - not useful

Root

- “root” account is a super-user account, like Administrator on Windows
- Multiple root accounts possible
 - Each root account has a user ID of 0
 - This is unusual
- File permissions do not restrict root
- This is *dangerous*, but necessary, and OK with good practices

Becoming Root

- `su`
 - Changes home directory, PATH, and shell to that of root, but doesn't touch most of environment and doesn't run login scripts
- `su -`
 - Logs in as root just as if root had done so normally
- `sudo <command>`
 - Run just one command as root
- `sudo -s`
 - Runs a shell as root
- `su [-] <user>`
 - Become another non-root user
 - Root not required to enter password

Setuid bit

- Usually used for programs which need to run as root

```
$ ls -l /usr/bin | grep '^...s'
```

```
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root      72792 May 30  2024 chfn
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root      44760 May 30  2024 chsh
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root      39296 Apr  8  2024 fusermount3
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root      76248 May 30  2024 gpasswd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root      47416 May 15  2025 ksu.mit
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root      51584 Mar  6 16:00 mount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root      40664 May 30  2024 newgrp
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root      64152 May 30  2024 passwd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root      55680 Mar  6 16:00 su
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root     277936 Mar  2 12:56 sudo
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root      39296 Mar  6 16:00 umount
```

Setgid bit

- Can be used to run a program as a user of a specific group without being a member of the group

```
$ ls -l /usr/bin | grep '^.....s'
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root shadow      72184 May 30  2024 chage
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root crontab     39664 Aug 27  2024 crontab
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root shadow      27152 May 30  2024 expiry
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root _ssh        309688 Mar  4 17:55 ssh-agent
```

Sticky bit

- The sticky bit set on a directory changes who is allowed to delete or rename files in the directory
- Normally, file deletion/renaming is controlled by the write permission on the directory
- With the sticky bit set, only the owner of the file (or of the directory or root) can delete/rename a file

```
$ ls -ld /tmp
```

```
drwxrwxrwt 19 root root 12288 Mar 30 15:49 /tmp
```

Changing Permissions

- Permissions are changed with **chmod** or through a GUI
- Only the file owner or root can change permissions
- If a user owns a file, the user can use **chgrp** to set its group to any group of which the user is a member
- root can change file ownership with **chown** (and can optionally change group in the same command)
- **chown**, **chmod**, and **chgrp** can take the -R option to recurse through subdirectories

Examples of Changing Permissions

<code>chown -R root dir1</code>	Changes ownership of dir1 and everything within it to root
<code>chmod g+w,o-rwx file1 file2</code>	Adds group write permission to file1 and file2, denying all access to others
<code>chmod -R g=rwX dir1</code>	Adds group read/write permission to dir1 and everything within it, and group execute permission on files or directories where someone has execute permission
<code>chgrp testgrp file1</code>	Sets file1's group to testgrp, if the user is a member of that group
<code>chmod u+s file1</code>	Sets the setuid bit on file1. (Doesn't change execute bit.)

Real and effective UID/GID

- Processes (on UNIX-like systems at least) have both real and effective user IDs and group IDs; UID vs. EUID, GID vs. EGID
- Real UID/GID are the actual user's UID/GID
- EUID/EGID are normally the same as UID/GID but when running setuid/setgid processes, the EUID/EGID is set to the owner/group of the executed file
- File permissions are checked using the EUID/EGID

Changing UID programmatically

- `setuid()`, `seteuid()`, `setgid()`, `setegid()` change the IDs
- Restrictions on which IDs can be set, read the man pages
- Also Linux has a separate file system user/group IDs (which are almost always the same as the EUID/EGID)
- Also capabilities separate from user/groups impact what ID values can be set

Aside: exploiting setuid root programs

- In project 1, the provided shellcode for most targets was
setuid(0)
execve("/bin/sh", NULL, NULL)
- Without changing the real UID to root, sh would set its EUID to the real UID, dropping root privileges