
Lecture 28 – Message Integrity

Stephen Checkoway Oberlin College Slides from Miller & Bailey's ECE 422 **Cryptography** is the study/practice of techniques for secure communication, even in the presence of powerful adversaries who have control over the underlying channel



Learning goals of cryptography module

- Understand the interfaces of basic crypto primitives

Hashes, MACs, symmetric encryption, public key encryption, digital signatures, key exchange

- Apply the adversarial mindset to crypto protocols
- Appreciate the following warning:

"Don't roll your own Crypto!"

- Familiarity with concepts, vocabulary

Lectures are for breadth

Cryptography is not just encryption! Cryptography can help ensure:

- Confidentiality: secrecy, privacy
- Integrity: tamper resilience
- Availability
- Non-repudiability, or deniability


.... many more properties

Message Integrity

Hashes, MACs


Goal: Secure File Transfer

Alice wants to send file *m* to Bob (let's say, a 4 Gigabyte movie) Mallory wants to trick Bob into accepting a file Alice didn't send



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


Setup assumption: Securely transfer a short message!

Solution: Collision Resistant Hash Function (CRHF) Hash Function $h: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{256}$ (or other fixed number)

1. Alice computes $\mathbf{v} := \mathbf{h}(\mathbf{m})$

2. Alice transfers **v** over secure channel, **m** over insecure channel



3. Bob verifies that $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{h}(\mathbf{m'})$, accepts file iff this is true

Function h? We're sunk if Mallory can compute $m' \neq m$ where h(m) = h(m')! A collision!

Contrast with: "checksums" e.g. CRC32.... defend against random errors, not a deliberate attacker!

Hash function properties

Good hash functions should have the following properties

First pre-image resistance:

Which of these properties implies which others?

Given h(m), it is computationally infeasible to find m' s.t. h(m') = h(m)

Second pre-image resistance:

Given m_1 , it is computationally infeasible to find $m_2 \neq m_1$ s.t. $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$


Collision resistance:

It is computationally infeasible to find any $m_1 \neq m_2$ s.t. $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$

Hash function construction


- Merkle–Damgård construction
 - Pad message to a multiple of block size
 - Run a compression function over each block and the output of the previous compressed block (see next slide)
 - Used for MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2
- Sponge construction
 - Pad message to a multiple of a fixed size (the bitrate r)
 - "Absorb" the message r bits at a time by XORing with part of the internal state, and permuting the whole state by permutation f
 - "Squeeze" out the output r bits at a time, applying f in between
 - SHA-3

Merkle–Damgård Construction



Sponge construction

- Internal state initially 0 r+c total bits
- P_i are message blocks
- Z_i are the output blocks



What is SHA256?


\$ sha256sum file.dat The SHA256 compression function, h

Cryptographic hash

Input: arbitrary length data (<u>No key</u>) Output: 256 bits

Built with compression function, **h** (256 bits, 512 bits) in \rightarrow 256 bits out Designed to be really hairy (64 rounds of this)!

> Confusion and Diffusion



00:09:41.18

3:28 / 7:51

7 2 7 2 7 2 0001110010011100101 1010010001111110 10101000100011 0001000100011

> "One round of the algorithm takes 16 minutes, 45 seconds which works out to a hash rate of 0.67 hashes per day."

Other hash functions: MD5

- Once ubiquitous
- Broken in 2004
- Turns out to be easy to find *collisions*
- (pairs of messages with same MD5 hash)

SHA-1

- Still in use in some places, but going away fast Broken in 2017
- Don't use in new applications

SHA-3

Different construction: "Sponge" Not susceptible to *length-extension*

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Lifetimes of popular cryptographic hashes (the rainbow chart)																																							
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Key Didn't exist/not public Under peer review Considered strong Minor weakness Weakened Broken Collision foun

[1] Note that 128-bit hashes are at best 2-64 complexity to break; using a 128-bit hash is irresponsible based on sheer digest length.

[2] What happened in 2004? Xiaoyun Wang and Dengguo Feng and Xuejia Lai and Hongbo Yu happened.

[3] Google spent 6500 CPU years and 110 GPU years to convince everyone we need to stop using SHA-1 for security critical applications. Also because it was cool.
 [4] In 2007, the NIST launched the SHA-3 competition because "Although there is no specific reason to believe that a practical attack on any of the SHA-2 family of hash

functions is imminent, a successful collision attack on an algorithm in the SHA-2 family could have catastrophic effects for digital signatures." One year later the first strength reduction was published.

Important use of Collision-Resistant Hash Functions: *Commit names of files in source code repositories*

- •- The "name" of a commit is a hash of all the files in its contents.
- •- The hash of a folder is the hash of the hashes of each file contained within
 - i.e. an "authenticated data structure"
- [What are the advantages of this?]
- [What happens if there is a collision? 1st preimage?]

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RISK ASSESSMENT ---

Watershed SHA1 collision just broke the WebKit repository, others may follow

"Please exercise care" with colliding PDFs, researchers advise software developers.

DAN GOODIN - 2/24/2017, 2:28 PM



Yes - please exercise care, as SHA-1 colliding files are currently breaking SVN repositories. Subversion servers use SHA-1 for deduplication and repositories become corrupted when two colliding files are committed to the repository. This has been discovered in WebKit's Subversion repository and independently confirmed by us. Due to the corruption the Subversion server will not accept further commits.



How do you find a collision?

- Pigeonhole principle: collisions must exist

Input space {0,1}* larger than output {0,1}²⁵⁶ - **Birthday attack:** build a table with 2¹²⁸ entries With ~50% probability, have a collision - **Cycle finding:** "Tortoise and hare" algorithm

h(x), h(h(x)), h(h(h(x), .., hⁱ(x)

- These are **generic**—actual attacks rely on **structure** of the particular function

Most cryptographic primitives come with a security parameter Usually k, or λ

- Often corresponds to a key size
- Cryptography protocols run in polynomial time
 i.e., as a function of λ, O(poly(λ))
- Ideally, we can show that the chance of failure is negligible, or vanishingly small as a function of $\,\lambda$

 $O(negl(\lambda))$

Concrete Parameterization

How large of a digest size should we choose?

1. Estimate an attacker's budget

E.g., the entire NSA

2. Consider the best known attacks


Reduction from protocol to well-studied problem

3. Add a safety margin

If all goes well, adding 1 bit increases search space by 2x


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
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Solution: Message Authentication Code (MAC)

1. Alice computes **v** := *f*(**m**)



3. Bob verifies that v' = f(m'), accepts message iff this is true

Function **f**?

Easily computable by Alice and Bob; <u>not</u> computable by Mallory (Idea: Secret only Alice & Bob know) We're sunk if Mallory can learn *f*(m') for any m ≠ m'!

Candidate *f*: Random function

- *Input:* Any size up to huge maximum
- *Output:* Fixed size (e.g. 256 bits)

Defined by a giant lookup table that's filled in by flipping coins

- $0 \quad \rightarrow \quad 0011111001010001...$
- $1 \quad \rightarrow \quad 1110011010010100...$
- $2 \quad \rightarrow \quad 0101010001010000...$

Completely impractical

Provably <u>secure</u>

[Why?]

[Why?]

Want a function that's practical but "looks random"... **Pseudorandom function (PRF)**

Let's build one:

Start with a big *family of functions f*₀, *f*₁, *f*₂, ... all known to Mallory
Use *f*_k, where **k** is a secret value (or "key") known only to Alice/Bob **k** is (say) 256 bits, chosen randomly

Kerckhoffs's Principle

Don't rely on secret functions

Use a secret key to choose from a function family

[Why?]

More formal definition of a secure **PRF**:

Game against Mallory

- 1. We flip a coin secretly to get bit **b**
- 2. If **b**=0, let **g** be a random function If **b**=1, let $\boldsymbol{g} = \boldsymbol{f}_{\mathbf{k}}$, where **k** is a randomly chosen secret
- 3. Repeat until Mallory says "stop": Mallory chooses \mathbf{x} ; we announce $\mathbf{g}(\mathbf{x})$
- Mallory guesses **b** 4.

We say **f** is a secure PRF if Mallory can't do (much) better than random guessing

i.e., f_k is indistinguishable in practice from a random function, unless you know k

Important fact: There's an algorithm that always wins for Mallory

[What is it?] [How to fix it?]

A solution for Alice and Bob:

- 1. Let **f** by a secure PRF
- 2. In advance, choose a random **k** known only to Alice and Bob
- 3. Alice computes $\mathbf{v} := \mathbf{f}_{\mathbf{k}}(\mathbf{m})$



 Bob verifies that v' = f_k(m'), accepts message iff this is true

[Important assumptions?]


What if Alice and Bob want to send more than one message?

[Attacks?] [Solutions?]

Is this a secure PRF?

$f_{k}(m) = SHA256(|| m)$

Merkle–Damgård Construction



Formalize SHA-256

- Let IV be the initialization vector
- Let $h: \{0,1\}^{256} \times \{0,1\}^{512} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{256}$ be the compression function
- Let pad(*len*) be the padding appended to a *len*-bit message
- $msg \parallel pad(|msg|) = B_0 \parallel B_1 \parallel \cdots \parallel B_{n-1}$ where $|B_i| = 512$ bits
- Define $C_0 = IV$ and $C_i = h(C_{i-1}, B_{i-1})$ for i > 0
- Then SHA256(msg) = C_n


Formalizing our proposed PRF

- $msg \parallel pad(|msg|) = B_0 \parallel B_1 \parallel \cdots \parallel B_{n-1}$ where $|B_i| = 512$ bits
- Define $C_0 = IV$ and $C_i = h(C_{i-1}, B_{i-1})$ for i > 0
- Then SHA256(msg) = C_n
- If $msg = k \parallel m$, then $f_k(m) = SHA256(k \parallel m) = C_n$

Length extension attack

- $msg \parallel pad(|msg|) = B_0 \parallel B_1 \parallel \cdots \parallel B_{n-1}$ where $|B_i| = 512$ bits
- Define $C_0 = IV$ and $C_i = h(C_{i-1}, B_{i-1})$ for i > 0
- If msg = $k \parallel m$, then $f_k(m) = SHA256(k \parallel m) = C_n$
- Consider msg' = k || m || pad(|k| + |m|) || m'
- $msg' \parallel pad(|msg'|) = B_0 \parallel B_1 \parallel \cdots \parallel B_{n-1} \parallel B_n \parallel \cdots \parallel B_{n+j-1}$
- Then $f_k(m \parallel pad(|k| + |m|) \parallel m') = C_{n+j}$
- But $C_{n+j} = h(C_{n+j-1}, B_{n+j-1}) = \cdots = h(h(\cdots h(C_n, B_n), \cdots), B_{n+j-1})$

Recommended Approach: Hash-based MAC (HMAC) HMAC-SHA256 see RFC 2104



SHA256 function

takes arbitrary length input, returns 256-bit output

Message Authentication Code (MAC) e.g. HMAC-SHA256 VS.

Cryptographic hash function e.g. SHA256 not a strong PRF

Used to think the distinction didn't matter, now we think it does

e.g., length extension attacks

Better to use a MAC/PRF (not a hash)

\$ openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac <key>

Game against Mallory

 Give Mallory MAC(k, m_i) for all m_i in M In other words, Mallory has an *oracle* Mallory can choose next m_i after seeing answer

2. Mallory tries to discover MAC(k, m') for a new m' not in M

We can show the MAC game *reduces* to the PRF game. Mallory wins MAC game \rightarrow she wins PRF game.

This is a Security Proof

What is a **Security Proof**?

- A *reduction* from an *attack on your protocol* to an attack on a *widely studied, hard problem*

- Excludes large classes of attacks, guides composition
 - Proofs are in **models**. So, attack outside the model!
- It does NOT prove that your protocol is secure
- We don't know if there are any hard problems!
- The field of Modern Cryptography is based on proofs
- Most widely used primitives (SHA-256, AES, DSA) have no security proof. We rely on them because they're widely studied

So Far

Message Integrity

Next time ...

The classic problem in crypto:

How can Alice send Bob a message, with **confidentiality**?