## Lecture 17 – Browser Security

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CS 487 – Fall 2017
Some slides from Bailey's ECE 422

#### Documents


- Browser's fundamental role is to display documents comprised of
  - HTML
  - JavaScript
  - Style sheets (CSS)
  - Images
  - Sounds
  - Movies
  - Plugin content
    - Flash
    - SilverLight
    - QuickTime


## Document Object Model (DOM)

- The browser allows scripts to
  - add/modify/delete/style the DOM elements
  - make changes in response to user actions (e.g., clicks)
  - submit forms
  - browse to a new document altogether
- Scripts in one document can modify another document
  - We say that Page A scripts Page B

## Scripting other documents

- Very powerful capability and without constraints would be dangerous
- Consider having attacker.com open while logging into chase.com
- If attacker.com can script chase.com, what could happen?





## Clearly we need separation

- This is Risk #3 from last time
- Same Origin Policy (SOP)
  - Goal: Partition documents into equivalence classes that can script each other (including reading each others' content)
  - Each document is assigned an origin and documents can script other documents in the same origin
  - We construct the origin from the URL

### From URLs to Origins

- General form of a URL scheme://user:pass@host:port/path?querystring#fragment
- Most parts are optional giving URLs like http://www.uic.edu/chicago https://google.com?q=hello+world
- Origins are the triple (scheme, host, port)
   What's the origin for <a href="http://www.uic.edu/chicago?">http://www.uic.edu/chicago?</a>

What's the origin for https://google.com?q=hello+world?

## From URLs to Origins

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   What's the origin for <a href="http://www.uic.edu/chicago?">http://www.uic.edu/chicago?</a>

(http, www.uic.edu, 80)

What's the origin for https://google.com?q=hello+world?

## From URLs to Origins

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- Most parts are optional giving URLs like http://www.uic.edu/chicago https://google.com?q=hello+world
- Origins are the triple (scheme, host, port)
   What's the origin for <a href="http://www.uic.edu/chicago?">http://www.uic.edu/chicago?</a>

(http, www.uic.edu, 80)

What's the origin for https://google.com?q=hello+world? (https, google.com, 443)

Why does the origin include the host?

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  - To prevent attacker.com from scripting bank.com

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- Why does the origin include the scheme?
  - If not, then http://bank.com can script https://bank.com. An "on-path" attacker could inject <script>...</script> into http://bank.com which affects https://bank.com
- Why does the origin include the port?
  - Think about multiple web servers run by different users on the same machine. Without including the port, https://host.com:8443 could script the entirely unrelated https://host.com

### Not the end of the story

- Documents (and thus scripts) can load elements from other origins including images, scripts, style sheets, and flash objects
  - Loading these elements endorses their content and the included elements are considered to be in the loading document's origin
- Conversely, documents (and thus scripts) can submit forms which sends data from the document to some server
  - Submitting forms declassifies the data sent
- Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) can enable cross-origin requests





GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: gmail.com





GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: gmail.com



GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: gmail.com

http://gmail.com/
says:
Hi!

#TTP/1.1 200 OK

...

<html>
<head>
<script>alert('Hi!')</script>
</head>
<img src="//gmail.com/img.png"/>

\*\*img src="//gmail.com/img.png"//

\*\*img src="//gmail.com/img.png"//

\*\*img src="//gmail.com/img.png"//

\*\*img src="//gmail.com/img.png"//

\*\*img src="//gmail.

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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
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                                                                gmail.com
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                                  </head>
                                 <img src="//gmail.com/img.png"/>
                    GET /img.png HTTP/1.1
                    Host: gmail.com
                                 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
                                 <89>PNG^M ...
```

GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: gmail.com

```
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```





GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: gmail.com







GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: gmail.com HTTP/1.1 200 OK gmail.com <script> \$.get('http://gmail.com/msgs.jsom') function (data) { alert(data) }); </script>

GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: gmail.com

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

... gmail.com/msgs.json',
function (data) { alert(data) });


function (data) { alert(data) });

function (data) { alert(data) });

//script>
```

GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: gmail.com HTTP/1.1 200 OK gmail.com 3.get('http://gmail.com/msgs.json', <script> function (data) { alert(data) }); \$.get('http://gmail.com/msgs.jsom') function (data) { alert(data) }); </script> GET /msgs.json HTTP/1.1 Host: gmail.com

GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: gmail.com HTTP/1.1 200 OK gmail.com 3.get('http://gmail.com/msgs.json', <script> function (data) { alert(data) }); \$.get('http://gmail.com/msgs.jsom') function (data) { alert(data) }); </script> GET /msgs.json HTTP/1.1 Host: gmail.com HTTP/1.1 200 OK { new\_msgs: 3 }



(evil!) facebook.com







GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: facebook.com

(evil!) facebook.com

























facebook.com





gmail.com



GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: facebook.com

facebook.com






gmail.com

















facebook.com





gmail.com



GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: facebook.com

facebook.com





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















```
$.get('http://gmail.com/chat.json',
function (data) { alert(data); })
```







```
$.get('http://gmail.com/chat.json',
function (data) { alert(data); })
```



GET /chat.json HTTP/1.1 Host: gmail.com gmail.com







## iframes

- Complete document inside a document
   <iframe src="https://somewhere.com/page.html"></iframe>
- The contents of each iframe belong to its source origin (https, somewhere.com, 443) for the iframe above
- The iframe element itself belongs to its containing document
- iframes obey the SOP

facebook.com





gmail.com



GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: facebook.com


facebook.com






gmail.com




































# Beware finer-grained origins

- Not all web features respect the SOP
- Example: Cookies can be include a path
  - In order to read a cookie with a path, the path of the document's URL must extend the path of the cookie

Cookie path: /a/b/c

Document path: /a/b <- Cannot read the cookie

/a/b/c/d <- Can read the cookie

- This is "finer-grained" than the standard SOP
- Is this a problem?


# Cookie paths example cont.

- Since documents in the same page can script each other, page /a/b can still read the cookie:
  - Create an iframe with src set to /a/b/c/d (where this the path of some real document that can read the cookie value)
  - Since the iframe is in the same origin, page /a/b can inject a script element into the iframe's document
  - The injected script reads the cookie value and sends it back to the containing page
- Cookie paths should not be used as a security boundary

# Mixed content

- Documents can contain elements loaded over both http and https
- Browsers indicate that this is insecure (by not displaying a lock icon) on the page with mixed content


• Other documents in the same origin are not similarly marked as insecure



# Mixed content


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
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- Yes, script injected from the element loaded over http could script other pages in the same origin...

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- Yes, script injected from the element loaded over http could script other pages in the same origin...
- ...except modern browsers explicitly do not run scripts loaded via http in an https page, so not really any more

# Cross-origin attacks

### Setup

- Web attacker
  - Controls one or more domains (e.g., attacker.com, evil.com)
  - Can cause the victim to browse to a page serving JavaScript at one of these domains
- Victim is logged in to bank.com (or any other interesting site)

Can the attacker's JavaScript read bank.com?

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- The attacker's script uses XMLHttpRequest("https://bank.com") which causes the browser to fetch https://bank.com and return its contents. Can the attacker's script read the response?

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  - No. Same origin policy
- Can the attacker's script use XMLHttpRequest("https://bank.com/transfer?from=victim&to=attacker")?
  - Yes! Same origin policy doesn't prevent this. The script just cannot read the response

- The attacker's site instructs the victim's browser to make a request to an honest site (e.g., using XMLHttpRequest or even just an enticing link)
- An XMLHttpRequest allows both GET and POST
- The browser sends all relevant cookies, including any sessions cookies identifying the logged in victim
- From the server's perspective, it looks exactly like a normal request from the victim's browser

POST /login?user=bob&pass=abc123 HTTP/1.1 Host: bank.com



HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Set-Cookie: login=fde874

••••

bank.com






GET /account HTTP/1.1


Host: bank.com

Cookie: login=fde874




















fde874 = bob

GET /transfer?to=badguy&amt=100 HTTP/1.1

Host: bank.com

Cookie: login=fde874









fde874 = bob

GET /transfer?to=badguy&amt=100 HTTP/1.1

Host: bank.com

Cookie: login=fde874

bank.com



HTTP/1.1 200 OK

• • •

Transfer complete: -\$100.00



## Why not make requests directly?

- Use the browser's state: The browser sends cookies, client certificates, basic auth credentials in the request
- Set the browser's state: The browser parses and acts on responses, even if the JavaScript cannot read the responses
- Leverage the browser's network connectivity: The browser can connect to servers the malicious site cannot reach (e.g., those behind a firewall)

- Need to "authenticate" each user action originates from the legitimate site
- Only needed for actions that change state (E.g., POST but not GET)
  - Why isn't it needed for GET?
- Possibilities
  - Secret token
  - HTTP Referer header (yes, Referer not Referrer, it was misspelled)
  - Custom HTTP header
  - Origin header

#### Secret token


- Hidden form field with the token value
- The token should be unpredictable to attackers
- Random numbers work, but then need to be stored server side
- Using crypto, we can do better (HMAC)
- The token should be sent along with every POST and checked by the server
- This is a hassle for dynamically-generated content since it needs to include the tokens
- What prevents malicious script from fetching the page (e.g., with XMLHttpRequest), reading the token, and then sending a response with the token?

### Example CSRF token

```
<form action="/transfer" method="post">
  <input type="hidden" name="token" value="8d64">
  To <input type="text" name="to"><br>
  Amount <input type="text" name="amount"><br>
  <input type="submit" value="Transfer">
</form>
                           https://www.cs.uic.edu/~s/t ×
                     ← → C  
Secure https://www.cs.uic.edu/~s/tem... ☆  
R  
© :
                     To joe
                     Amount 25
                     Transfer
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: login=fde874
                                                    fde874 = bob
<form action="/transfer" method="post">
 <input type="hidden" name="token" value="8d64">
                                                        bank.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: login=fde874
                                                    fde874 = bob
<form action="/transfer" method="post">
 <input type="hidden" name="token" value="8d64">
                                                        bank.com
    POST /transfer?to=joe&amt=25&token=8d64 HTTP/1.1
    Host: bank.com
    Cookie: login=fde874
```



This is not actually how POST data is encoded and sent, but the principle is the same

#### Referer header

- Sent by the browser and contains the URL of the page containing the link that was clicked or form that was submitted
- Easy to handle server side, just check that the request comes with the correct Referer header
- However, it is frequently stripped by the browser or middle boxes (for privacy reasons)
- It's stripped less often over HTTPS since middle boxes can't modify content

#### Custom HTTP header

- XMLHttpRequest supports adding custom headers but browsers disallow them on cross-origin requests
- Server can check that the custom header is present

## Origin header

- The evolution of the Referer header but only contains the scheme, host, and port, not the full URL
- As with the Referer and custom headers, the server checks the Origin is correct
- Supported by all major browsers
- Unlike custom headers, it's part of the standard

## Cross-site scripting (XSS)

- XSS is a method for attackers to embed content (often JavaScript) in another page
- Two basic types
  - Reflected XSS
  - Stored XSS

#### Reflected XSS

- Web attacker causes the victim to click a link to a legitimate page where the link contains some script
- The server includes the script verbatim in the legitimate page which is sent back to the browser
- The browser interprets it as script coming from the legitimate origin

#### Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

```
<?php

echo "Hello, " . $_GET["user"] . "!";</pre>
```





```
<?php
echo "Hello, " . $_GET["user"] . "!";</pre>
```

```
GET /?user=Bob HTTP/1.1
```





```
<?php
echo "Hello, " . $_GET["user"] . "!";

GET /?user=Bob HTTP/1.1</pre>
```



HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Hello, Bob!



```
<?php

echo "Hello, " . $_GET["user"] . "!";</pre>
```

```
GET /?user=<u>Bob</u> HTTP/1.1
```





```
<?php
echo "Hello, " . $_GET["user"] . "!";</pre>
```

```
GET /?user=<u>Bob</u> HTTP/1.1
```



HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Hello, <u>Bob</u>!



```
<?php

echo "Hello, " . $_GET["user"] . "!";</pre>
```

```
GET /?user=<script>alert('XSS')</script> HTTP/1.
```





```
<?php
echo "Hello, " . $_GET["user"] . "!";</pre>
```

```
GET /?user=<script>alert('XSS')</script> HTTP/1.
```



HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Hello, <script>alert('XSS')</script>!

```
<?php
echo "Hello, " . $_GET["user"] . "!";
```

http://vuln.com/

says: XSS



GET /?user=<script>alert('XSS')</script> HTTP/1.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK


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
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Hello, <script>alert('XSS')</script>!
```




gmail.com







gmail.com













gmail.com









# XSS capabilities

- Execute arbitrary scripts in the context (i.e., Origin) of the vulnerable server
- Manipulate the DOM of the vulnerable page
- Submit/read forms (including any CSRF tokens)
- Read cookies
- Install event handlers
- In essence, anything that JavaScript can do!

#### Stored XSS

- Some web sites serve user-generated content but fail to properly sanitize the user's input
- The attacker POSTs some HTML with JavaScript on the page (e.g., a post on a forum)
- When victims visit the page, the attacker's script is served and the browser (not realizing it came from the attacker) executes it as normal
- The script can do anything JavaScript can do!

# Example: Samy worm

- Myspace allowed users to insert HTML in their profiles, but disallowed <script>
- Some browsers support JavaScript inside CSS
   <div style="background:url('javascript: eval(...)')">
- Myspace disallowed the word javascript but Internet Explorer (at the time anyway) allowed

java script which bypassed their filter

Other filters were bypassed by using eval()

## Example: Samy worm

- Samy Kamkar discovered this and put some script in his profile
- When his page was viewed by a victim, the victim's browser would run the script which would modify the victim's profile to include "but most of all, samy is my hero" as well as the script itself
- Within 20 hours, over one million people's profiles were infected
- Myspace had to go offline to fix the problem
- Kamkar pleaded guilty to a felony and got 3 years probation, a fine, and restricted computer use (now he makes cool YouTube videos!)